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BOOK REVIEWS
PROGRESS OF THE LAW IN THE U. S. SuPREm: COURT: 1930-
1931. By Gregory Hankin and Charlotte A. Hankin. New York
and Washington, D. C. The MacMillan Company and Legal Re-
search Service 1931. Pp. xv, 525.
The yearly appearance of these volumes is no doubt serving
a useful purpose in summarizing and classifying along social,
economic and political lines the cases decided by the Supreme
Court. It contains a table of eases and an index.
The book opens with a chapter on Liberalism and Conserva-
tism, devoting twenty-five pages to Chief Justice Hughes and the
remaining five to Roberts and Holmes. This discussion is of
doubtful practical value, and is, of course, unflattering to the
United States Senate. The failure of the Court to assign reasons
for denying writs of certiorari is, in the opinion of the authors, a
serious source of uncertainty in the law, and one feels that this
opinion is correct. But it would seem that the practice is no more
conducive to uncertainty than are the actual decisions themselves.
One is tempted to say that the title of the book is misleading. It
is with difficulty that the reader can observe any "progress" of
the law, if that word is meant to be synonymous with improve-
ment, enlightenment, predictability, or closer approximation to
justice according to legal principles. Let us give a few examples.
In United States v. Felt and Tarrant Mfg. Co. the Court held that
a taxpayer filing a claim for refund must specify the ground of
his claim. But the ground of such claim is often uncertain, and,
as the authors observe, "This requirement .... makes the refund
depend not upon the obligation of the Government to return
amounts collected without authority of law, but upon the tax-
payer's ability to choose a tax expert who can assign proper rea-
sons for his claim, or sometimes guess correctly why the taxpayer
should be refunded .... We say guess correctly for in some in-
stances the Bureau of Internal Revenue itself is in the dark as to
what constitutes a sufficient claim for refund."
The reader leaves the chapter on Taxation with the feeling
that the Court is becoming very nimble in legal gymnastics, the
net result of which are to resolve most contentions against tax-
payers who have been compelled to resort to expensive and futile
litigation because of the stupidity of Congressional enactments.
1283 U. S. 269, 51 S. Ct. 376 (1931).
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The intensity of this feeling increases with the decision in
Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota,' overruling Blackstone
v. MXiler' (with the former of which this reviewer happens to
agree). The reasoning of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, in dis-
senting, seems to be pure rationalization in an effort to sustain
burdensome double taxation. And, finally, the business achieves
a comical effect in Coolidge. v. Long,' wherein both the majority
and the minority rely upon the same cases in support of their
respective views. One must note, too, Board of Tax Comm'rs. of
Indiana v. Jackson,' the "Indiana chain store tax case", with the
result of which this reviewer cannot agree. It seems that, as the
authors remark, "behind this classification for taxation lay the
purpose to curb the competition of the chain stores".
One discovers anew that in all but a few cases, state supreme
courts are loath to declare the unconstitutionality of state statutes
imposing taxes. In explanation of this tendency it is possible
that the state courts are composed not so much of inferior judges
as of astute politicians, particularly in those states having an
elected judiciary.
On the whole, the most interesting and instructive chapter in
the book is that dealing with labor problems. Particularly in
those cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
the statement of the authors seems accurate: "This is a very fruit-
ful field for hairsplitting distinctions as to what constitutes intra-
state or interstate commerce." Their suggestion, upon which this
reviewer makes no comment, is that the Court should reverse its
former decisions and hold that any employee of an interstate
carrier may come under its provisions, regardless of whether he
was engaged in interstate commerce at the moment of injury.
The analysis of the actions instituted under this law shows
that recovery is not governed by principles or standards but rests
with the juries, which invariably find for the plaintiff. It is
impossible to discover definite principles of law. Apparently
recognizing this rather cheerless state of affairs, the Supreme
Court avoids difficulties by refusing to review the cases.
The authors present an illuminating statistical commentary
on even-handed justice in a tabulation of "Federal Crimes and
Punishments", wherein one notes that while Mr. Albert B. Fall
received a sentence of one year for his oil-scandal activities, the
'280 U. S. 204. 50 S. Ct. 98 (1929).
8188 U. S. 189, 23 S. Ct. 277 (1903).
'282 U. S. 582, 51 S. Ct. 306 (1930).
'283 U. S. 527, 51 S. Ct. 540 (1931).
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defendant in Case No. 998 received five years for selling thirty
gallons of liquor.
Other notable cases which should be mentioned are those in-
volving the " Minnesota Gag Law"' and the "California Red Flag
Law,"' supported by good, meaty oratory, and commendable in
principle if not in result. Finally, the much-debated naturaliza-
tion cases of Macintosh and Bland are discussed fully. The
familiarity of the reader with these cases makes comment un-
necessary.
This is, perhaps, a dangerous book. It is fortunate that it
will not be read except by students of the law, professional or
non-professional. It will be a serious blow to our democratic
dream when the average man comes to observe, as he ultimately
will, the vagaries, the legerdemain, the uncertainty, inherent in
the nature of the judicial method of handling modern social and
economic problems of great magnitude. The Supreme Court is
gradually being divested of its garment of mystery, tradition and
infallibility, as the speed and accuracy of transmitting intelligence
of its decisions increases; and as the public through editorials,
essays and books such as this feels a growing power and right of
criticism. The quality of such criticism is not so important as its
volume and spirit of freedom.
And this fact is not derogatory to the Supreme Court. Com-
petent as it is, it is powerless to advance beyond the medium
through which, perforce, it must do its work. The ultimate diffi-
culty we shall have to face is the invention of some modern ma-
chinery to meet the economic and social problems which modern
civilization, willy-nilly, has evoked. Until then, it is the busi-
ness of lawyers solemnly, and with inscrutable countenances, to




PATENT RIGETS Fop ScIENrmc DiscovEmUs. By C. J. Ham-
son. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1930. Pp. 286.
The Constitution provides that Congress shall have power "to
promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
0 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625 (1931).
7Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 51 S. COt. 532 (1931).
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